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Abstract 
Insolvency has become endemic in the Australian construction industry. The scale of the problem 
has reached such proportions that both the NSW Parliament and the Senate have, in recent times, 
commissioned inquiries into construction insolvency. This paper aims to identify the reasons as to 
why the construction industry is so susceptible to insolvency, evaluate the effectiveness of any 
existing insolvency protection measures available to construction firms, and to identify proposed 
future measures to address the factors causing construction insolvency. The results of a 
questionnaire survey designed to discover the extent of the construction insolvency problem, as 
well as building contractors’ views with respect to the causes and regulation of construction 
insolvency, in South Australia are presented. The research found that there is an appetite amongst 
building contractors for the introduction of further regulation to address construction insolvency. 
Further, although the research found underbidding to be the biggest contributory factor towards 
construction insolvency, it appears to be the most difficult factor to address through regulation 
which explains the paucity of recommendations which directly address underbidding emanating 
from the Senate inquiry in 2015. 
Keywords: Construction insolvency, underbidding, security of payment, phoenix companies. 
Paper type: Research article 
Introduction 
Insolvency represents one of the biggest contemporary issues facing the Australian construction 
industry. No other single industry sector in Australia is blighted by the scourge of insolvency 
anywhere near to the same extent as is the construction industry. Data submitted by the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) to the Senate Economic References Committee 
(SERC) (2015) shows that over the period 2009-10 to 2013-14, the construction industry (which 
produced 8 to 10% of national gross domestic product) accounted for 23% of all external 
administrations in Australia1. The same data reported 2,153 corporate insolvency events in the 
construction industry in the 2013/14 financial year. Notably, these figures do not include insolvent 
non-corporations (such as small sole traders which account for 60% of all construction 
businesses) who have entered into bankruptcy. If bankruptcies of non-corporations were added 
to corporate insolvencies, no doubt the construction insolvency statistics would be even more 
alarming.     
A large proportion of construction insolvencies are experienced by small contractors and sub-
contractors; entities with assets of less than $10,000 (BIS Shrapnel, 2012). This is perhaps 
unsurprising as the vast majority of construction firms are small specialist trade contractors. These 
1 The next largest single identifiable industry is retail trade, accounting for 10% of all external administrations.
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alarming insolvency statistics, coupled with several recent high profile insolvencies of large building 
contracting firms leaving hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers unpaid, have in recent times 
prompted the NSW Parliament (Collins, 2012) and the Senate (SERC , 2015) to conduct urgent 
inquiries into the construction insolvency problem. 
Some may argue that insolvency of firms within a particular industry is not necessarily a bad thing; 
that natural wastage weeds out the financially weaker, less efficient and commercially reckless from 
the financially stronger, more entrepreneurial and commercially savvy operators. Whilst this 
‘survival of the fittest’ view may have some foundation per se, in the case of the construction 
industry it fails to recognise the fact that, due to the hierarchical contracting chains on construction 
projects, the ill-advised actions of one higher ranking ‘officer’ in the chain of command can be fatal 
to countless other ‘good soldiers’ following behind.2 As evidence for this, one need look no further 
than one of the many high profile head contractor insolvencies in recent years – such as Southern 
Cross Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd in New South Wales3 and Tagara Builders Pty Ltd in South 
Australia4 to name just two – which have affected hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers and left 
in their wake tens of millions of dollars owing to creditors. It is this vulnerability of those 
contractors lower down the contracting chain to the actions of those above which justifies 
regulation to ensure that principal contractors carry out business in an ethical, responsible and 
commercially sound manner. 
This paper aims to identify the key reasons for the construction insolvency problem in Australia, 
evaluate the effectiveness of any existing measures available for construction firms to protect 
themselves against the effects of insolvency and consider what can be done in the way of proposed 
future measures to address it. The results of a questionnaire survey designed to discover the extent 
of the construction insolvency problem and building contractors’ views with respect to the causes 
and regulation of construction insolvency in South Australia are presented. 
Reasons for the construction insolvency problem 
It is due to a combination of characteristics which are found in the construction marketplace that 
insolvency has proliferated in the industry. These characteristics include: 
• the pyramidal contracting chains on construction projects; 
• a predominance of trade credit throughout the construction industry; 
• the unsecured creditor status of building contractors and suppliers for work done and/or 
goods supplied; 
• poor payment practices; 
• underbidding leading to the prevalence of tight, or even zero, profit margins in the 
construction industry; 
• illegal phoenixing activity; 
• undercapitalised firms, which are not financially resilient; and 
• poor strategic business management skills of many, particularly smaller, contractors. 
Pyramidal contracting chains 
Subcontracting is endemic in the construction industry, with subcontractors providing the vast 
majority of building work on construction sites, as it facilitates the most cost efficient method for 
contractors to engage specialised labour. As such, contractors may be categorised according to 
which tier in the overall contractual structure they are engaged in (see Figure 1). Tier 1 contractors 
are those contractor firms who are directly engaged under contract by the building developer. Tier 1  
2 Martial analogies are not uncommon with respect to construction payment – see, for example, Christopher 
Rankin and Bob Gaussen’s submissions to the Senate Economics References Committee (2015: 14). 
3 See further Collins (2012: 8). 
4 See further Small Business Commissioner, South Australia (2016: 5). 
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contractors are head contractors who establish and run the construction site and manage 
construction activities to deliver the general contract works. Tier 1 contractors typically procure the 
labour and materials necessary to physically carry out the construction works by engaging tier 2 
contractors under contact. On commercial projects, tier 2 contractors are typically medium to large 
contractors specialising in the construction of one particular trade (e.g., concreting, masonry, 
joinery, electrical etc.). Tier 2 contractors supplement their full-time workforce by engaging smaller 
tier 3 contractors who then, in turn, may supplement their workforce by engaging even smaller tier 
4 contractors. Contractors towards the bottom of the contracting chain may very well be small one 
person sole trader firms. 
The existence of pyramidal subcontracting chains on construction projects, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
means that subcontractors are financially vulnerable to an insolvency or poor payment practice of a 
contractor higher up in the contracting chain. As stated by the Queensland Building Services 
Authority (QBSA) (2001), the financial failure of any one party in the contractual chain can cause a 
domino effect on other parties with those at the bottom most at risk in the event of a client or 
contractor defaulting. The collapse of one element of the contractual chain or the failure to pass 
on monies owed can create enormous financial strain on the other parties. 
 
Figure 1: Contractual chains on a construction project (Coggins et al 2016: 36) 
Predominance of trade credit 
Construction firms take much more trade credit from their suppliers (two to three times as much, 
depending on the measure used) as a proportion of their balance sheet than do firms in the rest of 
the economy (Ive and Murray, 2013). In 2012, in his inquiry into NSW construction insolvency, 
Collins, (2012) found that the average contractual payment terms between principal contractors and 
their subcontractors in New South Wales fell somewhere between 45 and 80 days, and in the worst 
cases extended to between 90 and 120 days5. 
This commercial pressure to extend trade credit terms to principals is passed on down the 
contractual chains in the construction industry, as each tier in the chain attempts to obtain ever 
5Subsequent to this finding, the NSW Parliament introduced prompt payment provisions into the Building and Construction Industry 
Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) requiring that progress payments under a construction contract become due and payable on the 
date occurring no later than 15 business days after a payment claim is made by a head contractor, and no later than 30 business days 
after a payment claim is made by a subcontracto
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generous credit terms from firms in the tier below in order to finance their works. This results in 
the perverse state of affairs whereby the smallest and most vulnerable construction businesses 
effectively end up financing the construction works on a construction project. Consequently, 
smaller construction contractors are exposed to extremely poor cash flow and high risk of payment 
default which accentuates the likelihood of insolvency. 
The prevalence of trade credit in the construction industry may be explained by the dominant 
bargaining position of principal contractors who, as providers of future revenue to their 
subcontractors, wield considerable influence in commercial transactions with them. Ive and Murray 
(2013) refer to this as ‘dominance hypothesis’, and note that under ‘dominance hypothesis’ 
subcontractors may lose money by providing credit to their principals at a cheaper rate than they 
can obtain it. 
Unsecured Creditor Status 
An unsecured creditor is a person who is owed money by a business, but does not have a security 
interest, or charge, over the credit extended (Coggins et al., 2016). Typically, most of the building 
contractors and suppliers who carry out works and/or supply goods on a construction project are 
unsecured creditors. In the event of the liquidation of an insolvent business, under corporations 
law6 the proceeds from the realisation of the company’s assets must be paid out to creditors in the 
following order of preference: monies owed to secured creditors, fees and expenses due to the 
liquidator, any outstanding wages and superannuation contributions owed to the company’s 
employees7 and, finally, the debts owed to the company’s unsecured creditors. 
If the proceeds are not sufficient to repay all the debts owed to unsecured creditors, as is often the 
case, whatever funds remain are distributed between the unsecured creditors on a pro-rata basis. 
This means that they may only see a small fraction of the money they are owed (e.g. 30 cents in the 
dollar) and, furthermore, it may well be up to 12 months before this money is paid. 
Indeed, ASIC figures indicate that insolvent businesses in the construction industry had, at the very 
least, a total shortfall of liabilities over assets accessible by their creditors of $1.625 billion in 
2013/14 (SERC, 2015). There are some measures which building contractors and suppliers may 
choose to adopt in order to protect themselves against losses caused by the insolvency of their 
principal. Contractors and suppliers, for example, may purchase trade credit or insolvency 
insurance; although many find the cost of such insurance prohibitive and damaging to 
competitiveness when tendering. There have been several reports and enquiries which have 
considered the introduction of statutory insolvency insurance to protect subcontractors (see, for 
example, Collins (2012); Security of Payment Taskforce (WA) (2001). 
All these reports, however, have advised against the introduction of such a scheme due to, amongst 
other reasons: 
• insolvency insurance providing no incentive for principal contractors to avoid behaviour 
that could bring about insolvency, knowing that should their businesses fail, they will not 
bear personal responsibility for the repayment of their debts; and 
• no information being available to suggest that the cost of administering such a potentially 
expensive scheme would be less than the cost of insolvencies in the sector (Collins, 2012). 
In Australia, principals often require their contractors to provide performance bonds as a form of 
security. This protects a principal against any extra costs in completing the works under the contract 
by being able to call in the bond amount from the providing surety in the event the contractor 
becomes insolvent. In the USA, although not in Australia, the use of payment bonds is common 
whereby a building owner requires their head contractor to provide a payment bond which 
6 Corporations Act 2001, s 556.  
7 Although, according to s 561 of the Corporations Act 2001, claims by employees for unpaid entitlements have priority over 
secured creditors with floating (but not fixed) charges. 
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guarantees payment from the surety to any of the head contractors’ unpaid subcontractors in the 
event of head contractor insolvency. This avoids subcontractors obtaining liens over the owner’s 
site8. 
Contractors and suppliers may also be able to create a security interest over any unpaid goods and 
materials, which they have supplied to a principal and are not yet installed into the building works, 
by inserting a retention of title clause into the contract. In such a case, in order to protect this 
security interest from other secured creditors, a contractor or supplier needs to register their 
security interest on the Personal Properties Securities Register (PPSR)9. 
Poor payment practices 
Undervalued, withheld and/or non-payment of contractors is both a major cause and effect of 
construction insolvency. There have been several building and construction industry security of 
payment reviews in Australia over the past 20 years, for example Price Waterhouse (1996); QBSA 
(2001); Cole (2003); Stenning and Associates (2006) which have concluded that a significant security 
of payment problem has existed for decades. 
Such poor payment practices have persisted despite the introduction of ‘proof of payment’ clauses 
into several standard forms of building contracts in the 1990s, which require a contractor, as a 
precondition to payment, to provide their principal with evidence that they have paid their 
subcontractors all monies due and owing. Indeed, the independent inquiry into construction 
industry insolvency in NSW heard much evidence that false statutory declarations are submitted to 
the principal by head contractors when, in fact, their subcontractors have not been paid, and that 
such false declarations were not policed (Collins, 2012). 
The Senate Economics References Committee (2015) found that poor payment practices towards 
subcontractors are caused by the little regard that head contractors often have for the impact of the 
financial pressures on subcontractors together with the view that, due to their surfeit, 
subcontractors are expendable and may be easily replaced without financial detriment (due to the 
holding of retention monies and work received on credit) if they become insolvent. 
Additionally, it is not uncommon for contractors, even those who are normally reputable, to find it 
difficult or impossible to avoid poor payment practices towards their subcontractors when they are 
inflicted by financial difficulties which may have been caused by their underbidding or the poor 
payment practices or insolvency of their own principal. Where poor payment practices occur, as 
illustrated in Figure 2, there is a risk that a vicious cycle of insolvency, non-payment, financial 
difficulties and poor payment practices may be triggered. 
In the worst cases, this vicious cycle may spiral down the hierarchical contractual chain whereby the 
construction insolvency of a principal contractor plunges unpaid contractors in the tier below into 
financial difficulties thereby forcing them to engage in poor payment practices with their own 
subcontractors which leads to construction insolvency. 
It is due to this long track record of poor payment practices in the industry that all eight state and 
territory parliaments across Australia have progressively introduced (between 2000 and 2011) 
statutory adjudication for payment disputes under somewhat diverse building and construction 
industry security of payment legislation. Whilst there is general consensus that security of payment 
legislation has improved payment culture within the industry, there is still much scope for 
improvement. As Coggins and Bell (2015) note, although adjudication usage rates might at first 
sight appear quite healthy, there is some evidence to show that adjudication is not as well used as it 
might have been due to a lack of knowledge about the legislation, as well as a reluctance of 
contractors to endorse their payment claims as being made under the Act for fear of losing future 
work.  In an attempt to continually improve the effect of the legislation on security of payment, 
8 Workers and mechanics liens legislation is prevalent in many US states. 
9 The PPSR was established under the Personal Properties Securities Act 2009 (Cth). 
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there have over the past couple of years been significant amendments made, in particular, to the 
Queensland and NSW Acts which has widened the diversity even further between the legislation 
interstate10. 
 
Figure 2: Vicious cycle of insolvency, non-payment, financial difficulties and poor payment practices 
(Coggins and Lord, 2014, p.225) 
In recent years, to further enhance security of payment, there have been calls for the introduction of 
project trust accounts or project bank accounts (Collins, 2012; SERC, 2015), which require progress 
payment monies paid by the owner to a head building contractor to be deposited into a trust or 
project bank account from which all subcontractors are to be paid before the head contractor is 
permitted to access the monies for their own use. Indeed, project bank accounts have been trialled 
on selected government projects in NSW11 and WA12 over the past 2 to 3 years, and have recently 
been recommended for use on South Australian (Small Business Commissioner, South Australia, 
2016) and Commonwealth Government projects (SERC, 2015). Additionally, a mandatory 
requirement for retention monies to be held in trust accounts for projects in excess of $20 million 
was introduced into NSW on 1 May 2015. Such trust or project bank accounts prevent the head 
contractor from using the subcontractors’ progress payment monies and/or associated retention 
monies for other purposes (e.g., transferring the monies to pay subcontractors on another project), 
and also protect the subcontractors’ progress payment monies from the head contractor’s secured 
creditors (e.g., the bank) in the event of head contractor insolvency. 
Underbidding 
The predominant method of tendering used in the construction industry is that of competitive lump 
sum tendering. This typically encourages high levels of competition in which contractors 
contractually commit themselves to deliver the specified contract works for a fixed contract sum. 
Accordingly, Williamson et al. (2004, p.61) observe that “The construction industry consists of a set 
of markets that form a very competitive system, so competitive that it has been said to be one of the 
closest systems to perfect competition.” 
Gerber and Ong (2013) note that price competitiveness is accentuated amongst construction 
tenderers by owners: 
• often viewing price as the most decisive criterion for award contracts, and 
• sometimes encouraging too many contractors to tender for a project, particularly in the 
case of government projects, due to accountability for public funds. 
As Gerber and Ong (2013, p.22) state,  
“Against this backdrop, contractors are motivated to win a tender by submitting an abnormally low bid 
notwithstanding any inherent complexities the project may face.” 
10 Furthermore, the ACT Legislative Assembly has recently passed amendments to their legislation, and a consultation process is 
currently underway for a raft of proposed wide sweeping amendments to the South Australian legislation (Small Business 
Commissioner, South Australia 2016). 
11 See further: https://www.procurepoint.nsw.gov.au/construction-procurement-direction-c2013-02 
12 See further: https://www.finance.wa.gov.au/cms/Building_Management_and_Works/New_Buildings/Project_bank_accounts.aspx 
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In times of economic downturn, competition intensifies even further as a result of “bidding war[s] 
for the shrinking pool of work which leaves scarcely any profit margin” (Australian Financial 
Review, 2012, p.44, cited by Collins, 2012, p.8). Indeed, in periods of prolonged economic 
downturn, it is not uncommon for building contractors to adopt a marginal cost pricing strategy – 
where firms tender to cover the cost of labour, materials and plant (variable costs) to construct the 
contract works and whatever contribution they can obtain towards covering fixed costs such as head 
office overheads and returns/profits to the business owners – in an attempt to keep the business 
running in the short term and ride through the harsh economic climate. Alternatively, firms 
sometimes may underbid on one project in order to obtain a cash flow to meet payments on 
another project (Creighton, Handford and Mclure, 1995). 
The practice of intentionally bidding at a price lower than cost is sometimes referred to as ‘suicide 
bidding’.  A suicide bidding strategy is often associated with a premeditated ‘claims mentality’, i.e. 
contractors who deliberately underbid with the intention of clawing back losses and forgone profit 
by submitting numerous claims during construction. However, this strategy is highly risky, and 
often results in disputed claims and financial difficulties for the winning contractor, which may 
kick-start the vicious cycle of insolvency illustrated in Figure 2. Alternatively, ‘unwarranted 
optimism’ has been cited as a reason for some contractors’ underbidding (Fenwick Elliott, 2015). 
The highly competitive nature of the construction market may lead to head contractors engaging in 
‘bid shopping’, which is widely viewed to be an unethical practice. Bid shopping involves head 
contractors attempting to use the lowest tender price submitted by a subcontractor in a competitive 
tender process as a ‘bargaining chip’ in order to drive down tender prices even further by 
negotiation. As Uher and Davenport (2009, p.211) observe, “Despite the presence of codes of 
ethics and tendering, bid shopping is actively employed by general contractors.” 
Bid depositories, which are typically administered by contractors’ associations13, are used in some 
US states and Canadian provinces in order to prevent bid shopping. In these jurisdictions, building 
owners may choose to conduct the tender process for their construction project through a bid 
depository. Where bid depositories are used, subcontractors submit their tenders on the various 
trade packages to the bid depository who then passes a copy of the bids to both the building owner 
and the head contractors who have confirmed their intention to tender for the general project 
works. The head contractors then compile their own tenders for the general contract works, which 
must identify which subcontractor’s tender was used for each trade, and submit them to the 
building owner. This prevents bid shopping as the building owner has received the subcontractors’ 
tendered prices from the bid depository, thus bringing transparency to the tendering process. It 
should be noted, however, that the effectiveness of bid depositories has been somewhat curtailed in 
the USA by a number of anti-trust legal cases where plaintiff contractors and subcontractors have 
successfully argued that bid depositories have led to restraint of trade or competition – for example, 
by only allowing subcontractors who are members of a particular association to submit bids to the 
bid depository14. 
Illegal phoenix activity 
Illegal phoenix activity involves the deliberate liquidation of a company, after having transferred the 
indebted company’s assets to a new company, in order to avoid paying creditors, tax or employee 
entitlements15. According to the ATO (2016) website, illegal phoenix activity is typically 
characterised by the new entity: 
• carrying out similar or the same business activities as the former company, 
• having directors who are family members or close associates of the director(s) of the 
former company, 
 
13 E.g., the Associated General Contractors of America in Maine, USA. 
14 See further Editors, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1965). 
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• operating under a similar trading name to the former company, and 
• using the same business premises and telephone number (particularly mobile number) as 
the former company. 
 
In the worst cases, rogue company directors may become serial ‘phoenixers’, deliberately liquidating 
company after company in a systematic and cyclical manner (PwC, 2012). The Cole Royal 
Commission into the Building and Construction Industry found that ‘there is significant [illegal] 
phoenix activity in the building and construction industry (SERC, 2015, p.68). Furthermore, SERC 
(2015) received anecdotal evidence which indicates that phoenixing is considered by some in the 
industry as merely the way business is done in order to make a profit. 
Illegal phoenix activity contributes further to losses which unpaid construction contractors and 
suppliers suffer due to the insolvency of their principal. The PwC report prepared for the Fair Work 
Ombudsman on phoenix activity16 found that an estimated annual cost of $1.93 billion was suffered 
by businesses as a result of phoenix companies not paying debts or not providing the goods and 
services that have been paid for by creditors. Although this figure is across all industries, SERC 
(2015, p.72) commented that “it should be remembered that it is likely that the construction 
industry accounts for the greatest incidence of illegal phoenixing.” 
Furthermore, phoenix activity accentuates the damaging phenomenon of underbidding. The Senate 
Economic References Committee (2015, p.73) received a number of submissions that “phoenix 
companies are awarded projects through 'net-of-tax-tendering': that is where companies tender 
quotes calculated on the basis that they will not pay taxes.” 
Undercapitalised firms 
Undercapitalisation is a commonly cited reason for construction insolvency. In 2013/14, 
approximately 20% of external administrators’ reports lodged with ASIC nominated 
undercapitalisation as a cause of business failure (SERC, 2015). Undercapitalisation may be defined 
as a firm having insufficient funds to carry out their day- to-day business. The Security of Payment 
Taskforce (WA) (2001, p.8) observes that,  
Because the mainstream construction industry is heavily fragmented and specialised with capital equipment 
usually available for short-term hire it is possible to commence contracting in the industry with very little 
working capital. So long as there is timely payment for work done, and suitably generous terms of trade and 
credit available from suppliers, the business can survive on very high gearing or even cash flow alone. 
As such, it is typical for construction firms to have little in the way of owner capital; hence, they 
need to rely on credit and borrowed capital. As Collins (2012) identifies, insufficient capital together 
with excessive debt is one of the most common causes for construction insolvency. Insufficient 
working capital and the resultant dependency on timely cash flow means that many construction 
firms are not financially resilient in the event of payment problems. 
Poor business management skills 
The Senate Economic References Committee (2015) found that poor financial and business acumen 
was a principal cause for insolvencies in the industry, and received submissions from professional 
associations such as the Master Builders Association and the Housing Industry Association stressing 
the importance of ensuring that entrants into the industry receive more business skills training 
before being allowed to practise. The Security of Payment Taskforce (WA) (2001) found that the 
construction industry is more prone to poor business practices because it is usually technical skill 
rather than business acumen that induces people to become contractors or subcontractors. 
Poor business practice manifests in several ways such as, for example, persistent underbidding 
through a lack of appreciation of true business costs, a failure to understand both contractual risks 
15 This definition has been adapted from the ASIC and ATO websites. 
16 As cited by the Senate Economic References Committee (2015: 72). 
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and terms leading to the inability to recover unexpected losses, and poor cash flow management. 
Such practices can lead to the rapid demise of a construction business, especially in the harsh and 
risky financial environment of the construction industry. 
The need for empirical research into construction insolvency 
Although much anecdotal evidence exists within government commissioned reports with respect to 
the causes of construction insolvency (as discussed above), there appears to be little in the way of 
empirical data obtained via survey of construction industry participants. This paper attempts to take 
a first step in this direction by presenting the results of a pertinent questionnaire survey targeted at 
South Australian building contractors. Whilst the survey is limited to the South Australian market, 
it may be argued the similar nature and characteristics of the construction industry inter-State 
(particularly in terms of procurement, tendering and regulation) suggests that the results may be 
representative of building contractors’ views nationwide. Having said this, it is recognised that a far 
more satisfactory approach would be for similar surveys to be carried out in each state and 
territory, especially given the differing levels of economic activity occurring between them. 
Accordingly, further research along this line is recommended. The details of the research approach 
adopted and results obtained for the South Australian survey are presented below.     
Research method 
A questionnaire survey was carried out by the authors with the aim of discovering the views of 
building contractors operating in South Australia (SA) with respect to the extent, causes and 
regulation of construction insolvency. A questionnaire survey is a systematic method of collecting 
primary data based on a sample (Tan, 2002). Tan (2002) further highlighted that the purpose of a 
questionnaire survey is not to consider a specific case in depth but to capture the main characteristics of 
the population at a given time. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) suggested that a questionnaire 
survey is best suited to a situation where most of the questions are standardized. A questionnaire 
comprising four distinct sections was developed based on the factors identified in the literature review 
as follows:  
• Section 1 encompasses general demographics of the study sample, 
• Section 2 comprises questions to capture respondents’ perception of the impacts of 
insolvency in the South Australian construction industry, 
• Section 3 captures the factors that cause insolvency in South Australia, and  
• Section 4 captures respondents’ awareness regarding mitigation measures that could be used 
to protect firms from insolvency.    
The sampling frame for the study comprised building contractors operating in the South Australian 
construction market (as the unit of analysis) ranging from relatively small to large and including 
both head contractors and subcontractors. Therefore, the targeted sample for the survey was 
general and trade building contractors who had been prequalified for category 3 building work by 
the SA Department of Planning Transport and Infrastructure. Category 3 building works for 
general building contractors covers contracts between $2million to $4 million and for trade 
contractors covers contracts between $500,000 to $1 million. Although prequalified for category 3 
works, several contractors in the survey sample were also prequalified for larger contract works at 
the category 2 level17 and, sometimes, also the category 1 level18. Using the SA Government’s 
Building Project Information Management System (BPIMS) database, 174 contractors were 
electronically invited to complete questionnaires. Forty-two questionnaires were completed and 
returned, giving a response rate of 24%.  
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Results  
Data Analysis 
The questionnaire survey responses were analysed using following techniques: (1) frequencies; (2) 
measures of central tendencies (ranking analysis); (3) relative agreement index, and (4) correlation 
analysis. The IBM (Version 21) Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used 
for the analysis.    
Frequencies: Section 1 of the survey instrument was mostly composed of profile of the sample 
structured around nominal variables. According to Forza (2002), the relevant type of analysis for 
such data is “frequencies analysis” and it enables the reference to the number of times various 
subcategories of certain phenomenon occur. 
Measures of Central Tendencies: Some of the questions in Sections 2 and 4 use a Likert scale to obtain 
respondents’ opinions on impacts of insolvency and effectiveness of mitigation measures as 
discussed in the research methods section. The underlying objective of this analysis was to ascertain 
the relative magnitude of the issue and the effectiveness of purported solutions through the 
examination of the reported descriptive statistics (mean scores, standard deviation and coefficient 
of variation). As with previous studies (Kumaraswamy and Chan, 1998; Yuan, Shen and Wang, 
2011; Doloi et al., 2012) rank differentiation where two or more variable had the same mean values 
was achieved through examination and selection of the variable with the lowest standard deviation 
or coefficient of variation (CV). Based on the classification used to discuss the degree of central 
tendency, a benchmark of 3.40 was used to identify the significance of the responses. It should 
however, be noted that different approaches exist in literature for ascertaining the cut-off points 
when a 5-Point Likert scale is used to measure the levels of agreement. For example, Yuan, Shen 
and Wang (2011) adopted the cut-off mean value of 3.00. 
Relative Agreement Index (RAI): In addition to measures of central tendency, RAI was used to rank 
the perceived effectiveness of different mitigation measures put forward to respondents under 
section 5 of the questionnaire survey.  According to past researchers, RAI provides an unbiased 
tool to rank these measures according to the following equation (Holt, 2014).  
   …………………………………………………..Equation 1 
Where:  
W = weighting as assigned by each respondent in a range 1 to 5 of the Likert scale; 
A = the highest weight (5); 
N= the total number in the sample. 
 
Profile of study sample 
The positions of the individuals who responded on behalf of their firms are shown in Table 1. It 
shows that majority (59.5%) of the respondents where at executive level, either as the Chief 
Executive Officer, General Manager or Director of their respective firms, followed by senior 
managers representing operations (16.7%), commercial management (11.9%) and contracts 
management (11.9%). It is very clear that the majority of respondents occupy very high 
management positions in the company and are capable of assessing the companies' financial 
performance and future prospects.   
 
 
17    $4 million to $10 million for general contractors, and $1 million to $2.5 million for trade contractors. 
18 $10 million to $50 million for general contractors, and over $2.5 million for trade contractors.
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Table1: Job positions of respondents 
Position Number of 
respondents1 
% Cumulative 
Owner , Chief Executive Officer , Chief Operating 
Officer, General Manager, Director, Managing Director 
25 59.5 59.5 
Associate Director , Office/Branch Manager, 
Operations Manager, Project Manager 
7 16.7 76.2 
Commercial Manager, Estimating Manager, Estimator 5 11.9 88.1 
Contracts Manager, Contract Administrator 5 11.9 100 
Note: 1 Total number of respondents based on 42 completed responses to this question  
 
Table 2: Organisational profile of study sample  
Characteristics Number of 
respondents1 
% Cumulative 
Main role (sector)     
General building 16 38.1 38.1 
Trade 26 61.9 100.0 
Principal type of construction work     
Commercial 38 90.5 90.5 
Public Works 4 9.5 100.0 
Length of activity in the construction industry (years) 
< 5  2 4.8 4.8 
6 - 10 3 7.1 11.9 
11 - 15 4 9.5 21.4 
16 - 25 12 28.6 50.0 
> 25 21 50.0 100.0 
Number of employees2    
1 -2 1 2.4 2.4 
3 - 10 5 11.9 14.3 
11 - 20 10 23.8 38.1 
>20 26 61.9 100.0 
Notes: 1Total number of respondents based on 42 completed responses to this question; 2Based on average 
number of employees per year. 
The profile of the study sample is reported in Table 2. Of the forty-two respondent firms, 
• 62% operate as trade contractors and 38% as general building contractors; 
• 90% of the respondent firms primarily participate in the commercial construction sector 
and 10% in the public construction sector; 
• 50% of the firms have been operating in South Australia for more than 25 years, 29% 
between 15 to 25 years, 10% between 10 to 15 years, 7% between 5 to 10 years, and 5% 
for less than 5 years; and 
• 62% of the firms employ more than 20 full-time employees, 24% between eleven to 
twenty full-time employees, 12% between three to ten full-time employees, and 2% 
between one to two full-time employees. 
Vulnerability to insolvency 
Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 how vulnerable they believe the South 
Australian construction industry is to business insolvency. With a mean score of 4.07 and a 
standard deviation of 0.80, respondents have sent a clear message that the prospect of insolvency 
is high for construction businesses in South Australia as shown in Table 3. More than two thirds 
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of the respondents (76%) gave a ranking of either 4 or 5, indicating that the vast majority believed 
the construction industry is highly vulnerable to insolvency.  
Respondents were also ask to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 how much of a threat they believe the 
insolvency of other construction firms was to the financial wellbeing of their own organisation. 
A mean score of 3.43 indicates that respondents are not ruling out the impacts on the financial 
wellbeing of their own company due to the insolvency of other firms. Almost half of the 
respondents gave a ranking of either 4 or 5, indicating that they believe the financial wellbeing of 
their firm was under considerable threat from the insolvency of other construction firms. 
However, the robustness of this finding is somewhat undermined by the relatively low mean and 
relatively high standard deviation values of the responses as compared to those with respect to 
industry vulnerability to business insolvency.     
 
Table 3: Respondents’ perception on vulnerability to insolvency and threat on financial wellbeing 
 Min Max MS1 SD2 CV3 
How vulnerable SA construction industry to business 
insolvency 
2.00 5.00 4.07 0.80 19.66 
How much of a threat other companies’ insolvency 
could pose on the respondents’ company   
1.00 5.00 3.43 1.07 31.20 
Notes: Based on total number of 42 responses; 1MS=Mean score where 5= Very high; 4=High; 
3=Moderate; 2=Low; 1=Very low; 2SD= Standard deviation; 3CV=Coefficient of variation 
The above perceptions were verified by asking the respondents how many times in the last 3 
years their firm has lost money owing to insolvency of other firms. As shown in Table 4, 74% of 
the respondents’ firms have lost money at least once during last three years. This confirms a 
serious situation where vulnerability of, and threat to, firms due to insolvency is very high 
pointing to the need for urgent mitigation measures to be put in place to deal with the issue.  
 
Table 4: Magnitude of threat due to insolvency of other firms  
Number of times the company has lost money 
owing to insolvency of other firms 
Number of 
respondents1 
% Cumulative 
>4  2 4.8 4.8 
3 8 19.0 23.8 
2 15 35.7 59.5 
1 6 14.3 73.8 
Never 11 26.2 100.0 
Note: 1Total number of respondents based on 42 completed responses. 
In order to establish the interactions among these three variables, the ‘Pearson correlation 
coefficient’ and ‘Coefficient of determination’ was computed and the results summarised in 
Table 5. It provided an opportunity to test the possibility of respondents’ past experience to 
determine the perceptions on vulnerability and threat. Similarly, it verified whether the 
perceived vulnerability and threat have a common founding.   
 The significant correlations were between losses and vulnerability (r=0.403; n=42; p=0.008) and 
vulnerability and threat (r=0.493; n=42; p=0.001) suggesting that respondents perception on 
vulnerability to insolvency is influenced by past losses to the company and potential threats 
posed by insolvency of other companies. This finding relates to the very high mean score given 
by respondents to the potential vulnerability of construction firms in South Australia with very 
low coefficient of variation (MS= 4.07; CV=19.66). This indicates that perceived vulnerability is 
a collective voice and founded through past experience rather than a spontaneous response.    
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Table 5: Results of Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r) and coefficient of determination (r2) 
among vulnerability, threat and losses 
 Coefficient of determination (r2) 
Variable: Losses Vulnerability Threat 
Losses 1.000 16.24 4.84 
Vulnerability 0.403** 1.000 24.30 
Threat 0.220 0.403** 1.000 
Note:  ** Correlation is significant at (p < 0.01) level (2-tailed) 
Factors influencing insolvency 
Respondents’ views were sought on five factors that are responsible for insolvency at the firm 
level according to the literature discussed earlier. The factors beyond the firm level were not 
within the scope of this study and not included in the questionnaire survey. Respondents were 
initially asked to simply indicate whether the believed each of the factors per se contributed to 
the insolvency problem. As shown in Table 6, most respondents identified poor payment 
practices as a cause of insolvency followed by underbidding, poor financial management skills, 
procurement methods and undercapitalised firms. Respondents were also asked to rank these 
five factors comparatively in ascending order (1 = most contributory factor, 2 = next most 
contributory factor, etc.) according to level of contribution to the construction insolvency 
problem. As shown in Figure 3, forty-eight percent of the respondents ranked underbidding as 
the most contributory cause followed by poor financial management skills (24%), 
undercapitalised firms (14%), procurement methods (12%), and poor payment practices (7%).    
Table 6: Respondents’ agreement on factors influencing insolvency 
 Frequency Rank 
Poor payment practices 40 1 
Underbidding 39 2 
Poor financial management skills 37 3 
Procurement methods 34 4 
Undercapitalized firms 28 5 
Note: Based on total number of 42 responses 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Contribution to construction insolvency ranking ((1 = most contributory factor, 2 = 
next most contributory factor, etc.) 
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Mitigation measures 
Respondents were asked to indicate their firm’s awareness and use with respect to various 
measures that are currently available in the construction industry to protect firms from the effects 
of insolvency. As shown in Table 7, awareness of all these measures was high with the exception 
of the personal properties securities register of which about 50% of respondents were aware.   
Table 7: Firms’ awareness of mitigation measures that are currently available 
 Frequency Rank 
Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 42 1 
Prequalification of tenders  41 2 
Contractual clauses requiring Contractor to provide proof of payment to 
their subcontractors 
40 3= 
Retention 40 3= 
Performance bond/bank guarantee 39 5 
Contractual clauses allowing Principal to take work out of hands of an 
insolvent contractor 
35 6 
Personal Property Securities Register 26 7 
Note: Based on total number of 42 responses 
As shown in Table 8, respondents indicated that the use of these measures in their firms varied 
with retention being the most popular followed by performance bonds, prequalification of 
tenders and so on. Interestingly, the uptake of the building and construction industry security of 
payment legislation and contractual ‘take out’ clauses were relatively low. The use of the personal 
properties securities register was very low indicating this measure is not well used among 
construction firms operating in South Australia. Surprisingly, although respondents were well 
aware of the construction industry security of payment legislation, its usage was not as high as 
expected.  
Table 8: Firms’ usage of mitigation measures that are currently available 
 Frequency Rank 
Retention 34 1= 
Performance bond/bank guarantee 34 1= 
Prequalification of tenders 31 3 
Contractual clauses requiring Contractor to provide proof of payment to 
their subcontractors 
29 4 
Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 16 5 
Contractual clauses allowing Principal to take work out of hands of an 
insolvent contractor 
14 6 
Personal Property Securities Register 3 7 
Note: Based on total number of 42 responses 
Respondents were also asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 how effective they believe these 
measures to be with respect to preventing construction insolvency and lessening of financial 
impacts to the firm. As shown in Table 9, three measures were included under prevention of 
insolvency and four under lessening of financial impacts. With the highest mean score, 
respondents have indicated that Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act is 
the most effective out of the three measures in preventing insolvency. However, with a mean 
score of 2.73 that measure is not considered to be statistically significant in preventing insolvency 
(MS=3.40). Except for performance bonds (MS=3.36), the other three measures were not 
considered significant by respondents in lessening financial impacts due to insolvency. Personal 
property securities register was considered to be the least effective out of the four factors. A high 
disparity could be observed among respondents with regard to effectiveness of measures such as 
personal property securities, prequalification of tenders and proof of payment (CV>50%).      
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Table 9: Respondents’ perception on effectiveness of mitigation measures on preventing 
insolvency and lessening of impact of insolvency 
 Min Max MS1 SD2 CV3 RAI 
Prevention of insolvency       
Building and Construction Industry Security of 
Payment Act  
1.00 5.00 2.73 1.19 43.59 0.58 
Prequalification of tenders 1.00 5.00 2.44 1.25 51.23 0.49 
Contractual clauses requiring Contractor to provide 
proof of payment to their subcontractors 
1.00 5.00 2.20 1.10 50.00 0.44 
Lessening of financial impact       
Performance bond/bank guarantee 1.00 5.00 3.36 1.19 35.42 0.67 
Retention 1.00 5.00 2.69 1.16 43.12 0.54 
Contractual clauses allowing Principal to take work 
out of hands of an insolvent contractor 
1.00 5.00 2.69 1.28 47.58 0.54 
Personal Property Securities Register 1.00 5.00 2.02 1.12 55.45 0.40 
Notes: Based on total number of 42 responses; 1MS=Mean score where 5= Very high; 4=High; 3=Medium; 
2=Low; 1=Very low; 2SD= Standard deviation; 3CV=Coefficient of variation 
 
Government intervention 
Respondents were asked to comment on the need for government intervention to protect 
construction firms from insolvency and help the construction industry to improve its efficiency.  
The descriptive statistics of the responses are shown in Table 10. Firstly, the respondents were 
asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 how urgent they believe is the need for government regulation 
is in order to reduce construction insolvency in South Australia. With a mean score of 3.83, 
they agreed that there is urgency for the government to act. More than half (59%) of the 
respondents believe that government regulation is either urgently or very urgently needed. A 
relatively low CV (26.63%) indicates a high agreement among respondents for urgent 
government intervention. Secondly, the respondents were asked to indicate either in the 
affirmative or negative as to which specific mischiefs (or areas) government intervention is 
needed in order to address the insolvency problem. They indicated that government intervention 
is most needed in order to address underbidding followed by poor payment practices, poor 
financial management and undercapitalization as shown in Table 11.     
 
Table 10: Respondents’ perception on need for government intervention 
 Min Max MS1 SD2 CV3 
How urgently government regulations  should be 
introduced to reduce construction insolvency in South 
Australia 
1.00 5.00 3.83 1.02 26.63 
Notes: Based on total number of 42 responses; 1MS=Mean score where 5= Very high; 4=High; 
3=Moderate; 2=Low; 1=Very low; 2SD= Standard deviation; 3CV=Coefficient of variation 
 
Table 11: Areas where government intervention is mostly needed  
 Frequency Rank 
Underbidding  35 1 
Poor payment practices 34 2 
Poor financial management skills 31 3 
Undercapitalized firms 28 4 
Note: Based on total number of 42 responses 
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Discussion of results  
In accordance with the high incidence of construction insolvencies reported in recent times, the 
survey found that building contractor firms in South Australia firmly viewed that the 
construction industry is vulnerable to insolvency.  The survey also found, although to a lesser 
statistically significant extent, that building contractor firms in South Australia view the 
insolvency of other construction firms as a threat to their own firm. It is perhaps surprising that 
this particular finding was not more robust given both that the industry operates on the basis of 
hierarchical contracting chains and that the survey also found that a majority of the respondent 
firms had lost money at least twice over the past three years due to the insolvency of other firms. 
The three factors most identified by the respondents as being a cause of the construction 
insolvency problem were poor payment practices, underbidding, and poor financial management 
skills. However, in terms of comparative level of contribution to the construction insolvency 
problem, the respondents found the top three most contributory causes to be underbidding 
followed by poor financial management skills and undercapitalised firms. Somewhat surprisingly, 
perhaps, although the vast majority of respondents identified that poor payment practices was a 
factor causing construction insolvency, they found it to be the factor which least contributes to 
the construction insolvency problem. One possible explanation for this could be the focus of 
Australian parliaments in recent years on passing extensive building and construction industry 
payment legislation which has improved to some degree the payment culture generally within the 
industry. Although, having said this, the survey also found that security of payment legislation 
(along with prequalification of tenders and contractual ‘proof of payment’ clauses) was not 
statistically significant as a measure per se for preventing construction insolvency. This latter 
finding accords with the fact that a high construction insolvency rate still exists in NSW despite 
security of payment legislation having been in operation there since the year 2000.   
The survey found that awareness of respondents was high with respect to certain existing 
measures – namely security of payment legislation, prequalification of tenders, contractual ‘proof 
of payment’ clauses, performance bonds/bank guarantees and contractual ‘take out’ clauses – for 
firms in the construction industry to protect themselves against both insolvency and financial 
impact of insolvency. However, respondents’ awareness of the personal property securities 
register as a means of protecting their security interests in the event of insolvency was 
significantly lower.  
Of these measures, regular use of retention monies, performance bonds, prequalification of 
tendering contractors and contractual ‘proof of payment’ clauses was high. In comparison, use of 
the building and construction industry security of payment legislation and contractual ‘take out’ 
clauses was relatively low, with use of the personal properties securities register being very low. 
The relatively lower usage of security of payment legislation may possibly be explained by the 
potential for use of the legislation to negatively impact upon the future working relationship 
between contractor and principal. The low usage of the personal properties securities register 
may be explained by the lack of awareness of the register found to exist amongst many of the 
respondents. The use of retention, contractual ‘take out’ clauses and the personal properties 
securities register were not found to be statistically significant in the opinions of the respondents 
as measures per se for lessening the financial impact of others’ insolvency upon their own firm. 
Only the use of performance bonds or bank guarantees was found to have any significance in 
this respect. 
The survey found, to some degree of statistical significance, that the respondents believe urgent 
government intervention is needed in order to tackle the construction insolvency problem. More 
specifically, the survey also found that over 80% of the respondents desire further regulation to 
address underbidding and poor payment practices, with 74% desiring further regulation to 
address poor financial management skills, and 67% desiring further regulation to address 
undercapitalisation of firms. 
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Conclusion 
The Australian construction industry is characterised by an extremely high rate of business 
insolvency due to a unique combination of characteristics present in the construction 
marketplace including contracting chains, trade credit, poor payment practices, underbidding, 
undercapitalisation of firms and poor business skills. The construction insolvency problem is 
accentuated by the phenomenon of phoenix companies, where new companies arise out of the 
ashes of old companies that have been deliberately traded into insolvency. Phoenixing further 
fuels poor payment practices and underbidding with the construction industry. 
In addressing the construction insolvency problem, Australian parliaments have to date directed 
most of their regulatory focus towards tackling of poor payment practices via the enactment and 
subsequent amendment of the various building and construction industry security of payment 
legislation which exists nationwide. Although this has been a huge step in the right direction in 
encouraging a fairer payment culture, the legislation by itself has proven to be insufficient to 
alleviate in any significant way the construction insolvency problem. As evidence for this, one 
need look no further than the NSW experience where 1,113 construction insolvencies occurred 
in the 2011/12 financial year (Collins, 2012) despite security of payment legislation having been 
operational there for over a decade. As such, a multi-faceted regulatory approach is needed to 
address the construction insolvency problem, of which security of payment legislation is but one, 
albeit important, component. 
The questionnaire survey data presented in this paper indicates that there is an appetite amongst 
building contractors to address the construction insolvency problem – particularly in the key 
areas of poor payment practices, poor financial management skills, undercapitalisation of firms 
and underbidding. With respect to the first three of these areas, the recent SERC (2012) report 
into insolvency in the Australian construction industry has made recommendations to tighten 
regulations via, amongst other things: unification of the building and construction industry 
security of payment legislation (by the enactment of a Commonwealth act), the trialing and 
evaluation of project bank accounts on Commonwealth projects, closer scrutiny and prosecution 
of false ‘proof or payment’ statutory declarations, random financial health spot -checks on 
construction firms by building license regulators, requiring building license holders to 
demonstrate they hold adequate financial backing for the scale of intended project, and requiring 
building license holders to provide evidence they have completed an agreed level of financial and 
business training program (SERC, 2015). Additionally the Committee made several 
recommendations with respect to introducing regulatory measures in order to curb illegal 
phoenixing activity. 
Notably, however, the Senate Economics References Committee (2015) did not make any 
recommendations which directly addressed the issue of underbidding in the construction 
industry19. The practice of underbidding was found by the survey data presented in this paper to 
be the biggest contributor to construction insolvency. The paucity of recommendations to 
directly address underbidding is understandable given that the regulation of pricing would likely 
be viewed as an unreasonable incursion into the territory of free market economics and anti- 
competitive in nature. It is suggested that preliminary proposals for further consideration, with 
respect to measures which could potentially restrict underbidding practice, may include: the 
introduction of bid depositories on government projects to eradicate bid shopping; prohibiting 
‘bad faith’ underbidding as a requirement of the national Building Code or state building codes 
(where they exist), thereby banning offenders from tendering on government-funded projects; 
and looking into the legal feasibility of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
bringing actions for misleading and deceptive conduct, under Section 18 of the Australian 
Consumer Law, against bad faith under bidders. 
19Although, the Committee (2015: 165) did consider the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia’s (1995: 54) explanation that the use of 
trust accounts on construction projects would render it not to be in a head contractor’s interest to underbid for a project. 
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Having said this, it is recognised that it will be difficult to detect where the fine line has been 
crossed between a contractor pricing a tender over competitively (perhaps due to poor financial 
estimating or unwarranted optimism) in good faith (i.e. ‘unwarranted optimism’), and a 
contractor deliberately pricing a tender below cost in bad faith with the intention of subsequently 
attempting to reclaim losses via contractual claims, poor payment practices to subcontractors 
and/or phoenixing their company to escape tax and other liabilities. Nevertheless, given the scale 
of construction insolvency in Australia and the direct impact which underbidding has upon the 
problem, further investigation into how underbidding can be discouraged may be too important 
an issue to ignore. 
References 
ASIC, 2016. Small business – illegal phoenix activity. [online] Available at: http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-
business/small-business/compliance-for-small- business/small-business-illegal-phoenix-activity/ [Accessed 
26 July 2016]. 
ATO, 2016. Fraudulent phoenix activities. [online] Available at: https://www.ato.gov.au/General/The-fight-against-
tax-crime/Our-focus/Fraudulent-phoenix- activities/ [Accessed 26 July 2016]. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2012. 2011-12 Private Sector Construction Industry Australia, 8772.0, Canberra: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Australian Financial Review, 2012. Building industry slump claims another victim, Australian Financial Review, 15 
November . 
BIS Shrapnel, 2012. NSW Construction Activity and Insolvencies Report – NSW Inquiry into Construction Insolvency, 
November 2012. Sydney: BIS Shrapnel. 
Coggins, J. and Bell, M., 2015. Australia's security of payment experience: A crystal ball for 
Malaysia and Hong Kong', International Construction Law Review, 32(4), pp.420-54. 
Coggins, J., Davie, T., Earls, T. and Evans, P., 2016. Understanding Construction Law. Australia: 
LexisNexis Butterworths. 
Coggins, J. and Lord, W., 2014. Towards the reduction of construction insolvency: Examining the 
'supporting statement' requirement in New South Wales. Building and Construction Law Journal, 30(4), 
pp.224-37. 
Cole, T., 2003. Final Report of the Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry, Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
Collins, B., 2012. Final Report of the Independent Inquiry into Construction Industry Insolvency in NSW Sydney: NSW 
Government. 
Creighton, P., Handford, P. and Mclure, C.J. 1995. Discussion Paper on Financial Protection in the Building and Construction 
Industry. Project No 82.  Perth, WA: Law Reform Commission of Western Australia. 
Doloi, H., Sawhney, A., Iyer, K.C. and Renata, S., 2012. Analysing factors affecting delays in Indian construction 
projects. International Journal of Project Management, 30, pp.479-89. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2011.10.004 
Fenwick Elliott, R., 2015. Construction Insolvency. Address to University of South Australia’s Builders’ Organisation of 
Students and Staff Annual Dinner, National Wine Centre, Adelaide, 6 November. 
Forza, C., 2002. Survey research in operations management: a process-based perspective. International journal of 
operations & production management, 22(2), pp.152-94. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01443570210414310 
Gerber, P., and Ong, B., 2013, Best practice in construction disputes: avoidance, management and resolution, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, North Ryde, NSW. 
Holt, G.D., 2014. Asking questions, analyzing answers: relative importance revisited. Construction Innovation, 14(1), 
pp.2-16 doi: .http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/CI-06-2012-0035 
Ive, G., and Murray, A., 2013, Trade Credit in the UK Construction Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Construction 
Contractor Financial Positioning and Performance, BIS Research Paper Number 118, Department for Business 
Innovation & Skills, UK. 
Kumaraswamy, M.M. and Chan, D.W.M., 1998. Contributors to construction delays. Construction Management and 
Economics, 16(1), pp.17-29. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/014461998372556 
Price Waterhouse, 1996.  Improving Security of Payment in the Building and Construction Industry. Melbourne: 
National Public Works Council Inc. 
Queensland Building Services Authority (QBSA), 2001. Discussion Paper on Security of Payment. Brisbane: Queensland 
Building Services Authority.  
Saunders, P., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A., 2009. Research methods for business students, 5th ed. Edinburgh Gate, England: 
Pearson Education Limited. 
 
Construction Economics and Building, 16(3), 38-56  
 
Coggins, Teng and Rameezdeen 56 
 
Security of Payment Taskforce (WA), 2001, Security of Payment Taskforce for the Western Australian building and construction 
industry : report to the Minister for Housing and Works, Deptartment of Housing and Works, Perth, Western Australia. 
Senate Economic References Committee, 2015. ‘I just want to be paid’, Insolvency in the Australian Construction Industry. 
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 
Small Business Commissioner South Australia, 2016. Consultation Paper on Proposed Changes to the Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2009 and other initiatives to improve payment to subcontractors in the building 
and construction industry. June 2016. Adelaide: Government of South Australia. 
Stenning and Associates Pty Ltd., 2006. Final Report on Security of Payment in the Tasmanian Building and Construction 
Industry prepared for the Minister Administering the Building Act 2000. Hobart, Tasmania. 
Tan , W., 2002. Practical research methods. Singapore: Prentice Hall. 
Uher, T.E. and Davenport, P., 2009. Fundamentals of Building Contract Management, 2nd ed. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
Williamson, M., Wilson O., Skitmore, M., and Runeson, G., 2004, “Client Abuses of the Competitive Tendering 
System: Some General Principles and a Case Study”, Journal of Construction Research, 5(1), pp. 61-74. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S160994510400005X 
Yuan, H., Shen, L. and Wang, J., 2011. Major obstacles to improving the performance of waste management in 
China's construction industry. Facilities, 29(5/6), pp.224-42. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02632771111120538 
 
 
